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Because of its preoccupation with technology and its 
predisposition toward the practical, America tends 
to be uncomfortable with speculation and with met­
aphysics. The «behavioral revolution» that elevated 
positivism to the highest seat of honor in American 
social science was certainly consistent with the prac­
tices of the society. Nevertheless, the tide is changing. 
Increasing numbers of critics are raising their voices. 
Some call simply for more concern with values and 
goals, and some seek a synthesis between scientific 
techniques and speculative philosophy.
Herbert J. Spiro, for example, expresses the senti­
ment of many of the new critics when he points out 
that hardly any constitutional system is adequately 
satisfying its own citizens’ desires with regard to 
national purpose and goals. The general citizen, 
as well as the scholar, can hardly fail to perceive the 
«pervasive malaise over almost all the world about 
government and politics» that Professor Spiro notes. 
«Few political scientists today,» he writes, «address 
themselves to Aristotle’s questions about the good 
man, the good citizen, and good polis, and the rela­
tions between these.» He remarks, however, that 
«philosophy is becoming more and more political 
again: this is true of even philosophies and philos­
ophers who start off as explicitly apolitical or even 
anti-political, like the Existentialists.»1 Even David 
Easton now speaks of the «post behavioral revolu­
tion» and agrees with the new critics regarding the 
impossibility of a value free social science.2
Because of the place of politics as, in Aristotle’s 
words, the architectonic science, this paper examines 
the relationship of political philosophy to American 
politics and to the discipline which, for the sake of 
custom, it calls political science. It examines the 
consequences of the «behavioral revolution» and 
discusses the relationship of political science, hence 
political philosophy, to political action in the modern 
world. It contends that there will be political philos­
ophy, that it will have political consequences, and 
that if these facts are unrecognized the consequences 
will be highly undesirable. Unless the context indi­
cates otherwise, the terms political theory and polit­
ical philosophy are used interchangeably.
the inevitability of political philosophy
We are told that political theory is in trouble be-
1. Herbert J. Spiro, Politics as the Master Science: From 
Plato to Mao, New York, Harper & Row, 1970, Chapter 13.
2. See David Easton, «The New Revolution in Political 
Science,» American Political Science Review, LXIII 4 (Decem­
ber, 1969, pp. 1051-1061). Presidential address delivered to 
the 65th annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, September 2-6, New York City.
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cause it has failed to perform several important 
functions, such as unifying the discipline, clarifying 
political values, illuminating empirical political real­
ities, facilitating prudent guidance in political life, 
and advancing more significant research.1
If political theory is in trouble, it is only because 
it is unrecognized, and when it is unrecognized it is 
the discipline of politicai science itself that is in 
trouble. «To suppose... that there have been or could 
be ages Without political philosophy», writes Isiah 
Berlin, «is like supposing that as there are ages of 
faith, so there are or could be ages of total disbelief. 
But this is an absurd notion: there is no human activ­
ity without some kind of general outlook: scepti­
cism, cynicism, refusal to dabble in abstract issues 
or to question values, hard-boiled opportunism, con­
tempt for all theorizing, all the varieties of nihilism, 
are, of course, themselves metaphysical and ethical 
positions, committal attitudes. Whatever else the 
existentialists have taught us, they have made this 
fact plain. The idea of a completely Wertfrei theory 
(or model) of human action (as contrasted, say, with 
animal behavior) rests on a naive misconception 
of what objectivity or neutrality in the social studies 
must be.»2
It is difficult to question the contention that all 
action, particularly all political action, is directed 
either at preservation or change. If preservation is the 
goal, the desire is to prevent a change for the worse. 
If change is the goal, the desire is to produce a sit­
uation that is better. Therefore, all political action 
is motivated by some conception of «better,» or 
«Worse,» which, of course, implies a conception of the 
good.3 T. L. Thorson carries the argument to an even 
more fundamental level when he writes, «No one 
can say anything, recognize anything, understand 
anything without committing himself to a theoretical 
apparatus. And this theoretical apparatus is not 
something that can be proved. If Lasswell thinks... 
that he is merely analyzing, he is wrong. There is no 
such thing as mere analysis... The serious use of 
the tools of logical and scientific analysis commits 
one to a certain view of the world.»4
It is superficial at best to conclude that approaches 
to politics or descriptive theories can be made «scien­
tific» by discarding moral references and other val­
ue positions. The result of such an attempt is not
1. Neal Riemer, The Revival of Political Theory, New 
York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1962, p. 166.
2. Isiah Berlin, «Does Political Theory Still Exist?» Con­
temporary Political Thought: Issues in Scope, Value, and Di­
rection, James A. Gould and Vincent V.Thursby, eds., New 
York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1969, p. 343.
3. Leo Strauss, «What is Political Philosophy?» Journal 
of Politics, XIX (3 : August, 1957), in Ibid., p. 47.
4. Thomas Landon Thorson, The Logic of Democracy,
New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1962, p. 89.
to produce a value free scientific theory but rather 
to produce «a simple-minded unconsciousness of 
valuations that have become habitual.» There are 
at least implicit assumptions regarding the signifi­
cance of factors that are to go into any description 
of a social or political situation. The choice is not 
between values and no values, but rather between 
«implicit assumptions and the explicit avowal of 
what is assumed.»5
All political discussion, thought, and analysis 
involves value judgment. The questions political sci­
ence must answer are what values, and this is the prov­
ince of political philosophy. Thorson notes that 
David Easton, «for all his professed empiricism, is 
really in very much the same position as the classi­
cal metaphysician. He supplies us with a 'linguistic 
recipe’ in terms of which observations about politics 
can be stated.»6
There will be political philosophy; it is implicit in 
political science. The question becomes one of ra­
tionally selecting a rational philosophy. Those who 
have predicted the demise of political theory have 
been unable to explain away the fact that the notion 
that there can be non-theoretical political study 
itself is all too plainly a theory.7
For example, «if social scientists think ideals to 
be mere functions of an underlying pluralistic 
order but do not hold that this holds to their own, 
does not at least one set of ideals, namely theirs, 
gain the status of objectivity?»8
Few scholars have approached the degree of insight 
and perception in unravelling the difficulties inherent 
in the attempted retreat from political philosophy 
found in the writings ofMulfordQ. Sibley. Professor 
Sibley does not question the contributions of behav- 
ioralism, but whether the behavioral approach 
itself is adequate for an understanding of politics and 
society. He lists five points that go to the heart of the 
question:9
1. The very selection of subjects for investigation is shaped
by values which are not derivable from the investigation;
5. George H. Sabine, «What is a Political Theory?» Journal 
of Politics, I 0: February, 1939), in Gould and Thursby, p. 
18.
6. Thorson, Biopolitics, New York: Holt, Reinhart and 
Winston, 1970, p. 75.
7. A.C. MacIntyre, «Recent Political Thought,» Political 
Ideas, David Thomson, ed., Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969, 
p. 190.
8. Henry S. Kariel, «The Pluralist Norm,» Frontiers of 
Democratic Theory, Kariel, ed., New York: Random House, 
1970, p. 163. See also Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 
New York: W.W. Norton &Co., 1969, passim.
9. Mulford Q. Sibley, «The Limitations of Behavioralism,» 
Contemporary Political Analysis, James C. Charlesworth,
ed., New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 52-53.
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2. In the end, the concepts and values which do determine 
what and how one studies are related to one’s judgments 
of the goals which one identifies with political life and to 
one’s general «life experience;»
3. Once the investigation is launched, there are definite lim­
its to what one can expect from behavioral studies;
4. Behaviorally oriented study will remove one from the 
stuff of everyday politics and cannot be related to that 
stuff except by means which would usually be regarded 
as non-behavioral; and
5. If clarification about policy-making is one objective of the 
politicist, behavioralism, although destined to play a 
significant role, is restricted in what it can be expected 
to do.
In dealing with the nature of scientific thought it­
self, Professor Sibley points out that values must 
always he prior to any investigation. The techniques 
of behavioralism, or any other empirical approach, 
inevitably will be applied Within a framework of 
value judgments—judgments that cannot be supported 
solely through behavioral techniques.1
Probing deeply into the processes of investiga­
tion and verification, Professor Sibley notes that, 
«it appears to be impossible to define political things 
whithout answering the question of what constitutes 
a peculiarly 'political’ society, and a society can­
not be defined without reference to its purpose.»2 
The investigator must inevitably begin with an idea, 
and the conceptions that lead him to scientific in­
vestigation must rest ultimately on overall insights 
and what Leo Strauss has called pre-scientific knowl­
edge, «as well as something very akin to aesthetic 
experience.»3 Even the most extreme empiricist 
assumes the direct experience of «facts,» but as Mi­
chael Polanyi points out, all knowledge is tainted 
knowledge. That is, at all levels of cognition, there 
is personal participation.4
Could there be a better illustration of the diffi­
culties inherent in empiricism than David Easton’s 
statement that «ethical evaluation and empirical 
explanation... should be kept analytically distinct?» 
K. W. Kim remarks, «whether this statement itself 
is an instance of evaluation or explanation is an 
intriguing question.»5 There are many other in­
triguing questions that become apparent to those 
who examine the empiricist epistemology.
All political action and all political studies presup­
pose a political theory whether recognized or not. 
Those who perceive a decline in political theory 
actually are observing a crisis in positivist political
1. Ibid., pp. 53-54.
2. Ibid., p. 54.
3. Ibid., p. 56.
4. Ibid.
5. K. W. Kim, «The Limits of Behavioral Explanation in
Politics,» Apolitical Science: A Critique of Behavioralism,»
Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, eds., New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell, p. 40.
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science. In Dante Germino’s words, what they see 
is «the inevitable demise of political theory within 
the positivist universe of discourse, where the 'fact- 
value’ dichotomy reigns as dogma.»6 This situation 
has resulted in a considerably distorted view of 
political theory. Many students of government have 
lost sight of its original meaning. They no longer 
view it as an «experiential science of right order 
in society,» but rather as «ideology.» Ideology, of 
course, is conditioned by society whereas theory 
claims to be possessed of perennial insights. The new 
view of theory equates it with experimental hypothe­
ses, and only those propositions that lend themselves 
to testing in terms of sense experience are granted 
the status of theory. The political scientist who ac­
cepts this view therefore can produce such formu­
lations as theories of voting behavior, but he can 
conceive of no theories of the principles of right 
action in society or politics because such formula­
tions would be «unverifiable» by sense observation.7 
He probably finds it difficult to understand let alone 
accept the contentions of scholars such as Eric Voe- 
gelin, that political science and political theory are 
intimately bound up with one another into a «science 
of right order.»
The positivistic notion that only empirical knowl­
edge is truly knowledge would appear to be a bias, 
conditioned by our contemporary scientific culture. 
Post-behavioral scholars are beginning to recognize 
that non-empirical knowledge exists, and that it 
cannot merely be equated with error. Polanyi calls 
it «tacit» political knowledge, Strauss calls it «pre- 
scientific» knowledge, William Riker calls it «politi­
cal wisdom» as opposed to «political science,» Shel­
don Wolin describes it as a composite knowledge that 
actually is a mode of activity, more a style of reflec­
tion than a style of search. It does involve logic 
but it also takes account of the «incoherence and 
contradictoriness of experience.» For this reason 
«it is distrustful of rigor» and it tends to be «sugges­
tive and illuminative rather than explicit and deter­
minant.»8 Concentration upon «data,» however 
valuable data may be, has pitfalls. «Even those who 
would wish to address their minds to 'data’ are a- 
ware that data are constituted by abstractions, and 
that usually what has been culled from the phenomena 
are the subtle traces of past practices and meanings
6. Dante Germino, «The Revival of Political Theory,» 
Journal of Politics, 25 (August, 1963), Ideology, Politics and 
Political Theory, Richard Cox, ed., Belmont, California: Wads­
worth, 1969, p. 97.
7. Ibid., pp. 105-107.
8. Sheldon Wolin, «Political Theory as a Vocation,» Ameri­
can Political Science Review, LXII (4: December, 1969), p. 
1070.
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which form the connotative content of actions and 
events.»1
If we are to proceed intelligently, we must accept 
those propositions that can be verified by scientific 
techniques and reject the propositions that scientific 
techniques can demonstrate to be false. This leaves 
many things out of account. The proposition that 
God exists, for example, can be neither verified 
nor proven false, scientifically, which merely illus­
trates that science is incapable of answering all 
questions. It «simply does not provide an all-purpose 
epistemology. Its requirements for deduction in the 
context of the limited human mind require one 
to abstract and strip away much of the richness 
of life. Elegance and precision are gained at the cost 
of the poets’ pleasures. It deals with the correctness 
of descriptions regarding relationships among ab­
stractions, and not in the correctness of the ends of 
real men. Thus, to seek in science answers to ques­
tions of ethics or faith is to give science both more 
and less than its due.»2
The investigator must always begin with a non- 
empirically derived framework. He can demonstrate 
within that framework how men have acted under 
given and controlled conditions. He can demon­
strate how men probably would behave in the future 
under precisely formulated conditions. He can also de­
rive specific limitations beyond which, again under 
carefully controlled conditions, men probably would 
not act. These are the regularities that David Easton 
has concluded are the responsibility of the behavioral 
scientist to discover. The behavioral approach, on 
the other hand, can never explain the behavior of 
the behavioralist; it cannot tell what we ought to 
value in political life, nor can it forecast the future. 
At best it can produce only scientific predictions 
(i.e. «if-then,» statements, not prophecies).3 4It is 
well to outline the limitations of the scientific ap­
proach in order to prevent disillusionment about 
what it can accomplish.
Scientific techniques are indispensable to the mod­
ern study of politics, but if we are to understand 
politics thoroughly, we must not only know what 
it has been, what it is, and what it is likely to be, 
but also we must know what it could be and what 
it should be. We must therefore correct our scientif­
ic knowledge by «unscientific judgment about history 
and primary values.»1
1. Ibid., p. 1071.
2. Arthur S. Goldberg, «On the Need for Contextualist 
Criteria,» American Political Science Review, LXIII (4 : De­
cember, 1969), p. 1249.
3. Sibley, pp. 61-66.
4. Ibid., p. 66.
the science of politics
One of the difficulties that has plagued the «scien­
tific» investigator of politics is a tendency toward 
a naive view of science itself. He tends not to have 
progressed beyond pre-twentieth-century scientific 
theories. He frequently views the nineteenth century 
models that are inadequate for modern physics as 
the foundation of a science of politics. Floyd W. 
Matson, in his brilliant but too little known book, 
The Broken Image, has produced the definitive treat­
ment of this situation and its consequences.5
Space prevents from doing justice to Matson’s argu­
ment, but he demonstrates quite clearly that modern 
social science to a large degree has hardly progress­
ed beyond the models of Newtonian mechanics. 
He notes the inherent dangers of this to human free­
dom and calls for social science to become aware of 
the newer developments in sub-atomic physics, biol­
ogy, and psychotherapy. He warns that the social 
sciences have relied upon root metaphors and meth­
ods borrowed from classical mechanics and have 
thereby eclipsed the ancestral liberal vision of the 
whole man, giving us instead a «radically broken 
self-image.» The history of the breaking of this image 
has paralleled the disintegration of the inner sense 
of identity, and the retreat from autonomous conduct 
into automaton behavior in the contemporary world. 
«Despite the contrary inclinations of C. P. Snow and 
others,» he writes, «it is today less urgent that the 
humanities should be imbued with the values of 
science than that science should become alert to the 
values of humanity.»6
Regardless of the pretentions of many political 
scientists, «the social sciences today have yet to show 
one universal element or controlling 'law’, one unit 
of measurement, one exactly plotted universal var­
iable, or one invariant relation.»7 The discipline 
has yet to be revolutionized in the manner in which 
Thomas Kuhn describes scientific revolutions. There 
are many new «theories» available, but no new domi­
nant theory has been accepted by the discipline to 
the exclusion of all its rivals.8 To those who would 
contend that systems theory is the new «dominant 
theory» (meeting Kuhn’s criteria in The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions), Wolin points out that 
there is confusion about which of the several versions 
of the theory is accepted, whether any version at all 
is useful, and whether the popularity of systems 
theory followed rather than produced the behavioral 
revolution. He notes perceptively that American
5. New York: George Braziller, 1964.
6. Ibid., preface, p. vii.
7. Jacques Barzun, Science: The Glorious Entertainment, 
New York: Harper and Row, 1964, p. 185.
8. See Wolin, p. 1063.
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political scientists for the most part not only share a 
customary discomfort with theory per se, but that 
they have elevated this discomfort to a scientific stat­
us. Frequently, political scientists now allege a sus­
picion of theories to be a powerful contributor to 
American political stability and to the American 
genius for pragmatic rather than ideological politics.1
Many social scientists have so oversimplified the 
procedures of science that they fail to recognize 
that there can be no continuum from the physical 
world to the intellect. There is a hiatus between the 
material world and recognition of that world, just 
as there is no continuous process, but rather a flash 
of insight, between the awareness of empirical facts 
and the formulation of a framework or theory. Al­
bert Einstein has commented, «There is no induc­
tive method which could lead to the fundamental 
concepts of physics... in error are those theorists 
who believe that theory comes inductively from expe­
rience.»2
It must not bethought that the elimination of bias 
requires a truly «objective» approach or disillu­
sionment will be the inevitable result. The effort to 
eliminate bias must produce in the investigator an 
awareness of his own values and an explicit state­
ment of his values as values rather than as facts. 
He must also be aware of the values of those whom 
he is studying. This does not mean, as Weber would 
have it, accepting the values of the subjects in theory 
construction. As Strauss, supported by many others, 
points out, this would create a corrupt methodology 
requiring the social scientist to commit an error 
for every deception and every self-deception of those 
whom he studies. If this is correct, total objectivity 
is impossible. Moreover, there is a basic difference 
between the mental constructs or thought objects 
formed by the physical sciences and those formed 
by the social sciences.3 So basic is this difference 
that it produces great difficulties for the process 
of verification in the social sciences. The only things 
that can be finally verified tend to be trivial.4 Or 
as Thorson puts it, «the fact is that any attempt to 
make absolutely general statements about politics, 
statements intended to apply regardless of time 
and place, will end in truism or something very close 
to it.»5
1. Ibid.
2. Albert Einstein, The Method of Theoretical Physics, 
New York: Oxford, 1933, quoted by Thorson in The Logic 
of Democracy, p. 98.
3. See Arthur L. Kalleberg, «Concept Formation in Norma­
tive and Empirical Studies: Toward Reconciliation in Political 
Theory,» American Political Science Review, LXIII (1: March, 
1969), pp. 29-32.
4. See George Kateb, Political Theory: Its Nature and Uses, 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1968, p. 83.
5. Thorson, Biopolitics, p. 70.
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We are told that politics is who gets what, when, 
how; that it refers to power. It is true that politics 
should refer to power, but also it should refer to 
some conception of human welfare or the public 
good.8 Bay has performed a public service in coining 
the term «pseudopolitics» to apply to apparently 
political activities that have no reference to a public 
purpose. Bay shares with Bernard Crick and others a 
concern for «politics.» He takes issue with the plu­
ralist model that assumes that politics must remain 
«primarily a system of rules for peaceful battles be­
tween competing private interests, and not an arena 
for the struggle toward a more humane and more 
rationally organized society.»7
It is strange that the pluralist model has so sel­
dom been recognized for what it is, a sophisticated 
group version of the outmoded individualistic lais­
sez-faire ideas of the early economists. One would 
almost expect the discipline of political science next 
to conceive of the doctrine of an unseen guiding hand 
that governs the market place of politics. We arrive 
back at philosophy when we discover that many of 
the writings based upon the pluralist model affirm 
that American democracy works well without giving 
the criteria upon which the judgment is based.8
Any formulation of such criteria on a formal ba­
sis, of course, would be explicitly philosophical and 
would produce grave discomfort. Bay notes that 
if medical literature were to follow the practice set by 
most political science literature «its scope would in 
the main be confined to studying how patients choose 
to cope or at any rate do cope with their pathologies, 
while omitting or neglecting fundamental study of 
conditions for possible treatment and prevention.»9
Similar criticisms may be leveled at the «end of 
ideology» literature. The irony of the situation is 
that many of these writings themselves display every 
characteristic of ideology. Social science would be 
much better off if it acknowledges frankly that it 
has not solved Mannheim’s paradox.10
In studying any society, knowledge of its political 
theory is of inestimable value. It gives insights into 
the political values held by the citizens. These, of 
course, define the goals of the society, and indicate 
which means may be appropriate for achieving them. 
Since all political writing will display political the­
ory, even the most thoroughly, empirical works of-
6. See Christian Bay, «Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Criti­
cal Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature,» American Po­
litical Science Review, LXI (1 : March, 1965), p. 40.
7. Ibid., p. 44.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 45.
10. Joseph LaPalombara, «Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and 
An Interpretation,» American Political Science Review, IX 
(1 : March, 1966), p. 6.
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fer insights into the values of their authors and of 
the societies producing them.
Political institutions and organizations can be un­
derstood only in the light of men’s purposes.1 
Enlightenment regarding the basic nature of political 
institutions can and does come about as much from 
speculation and reflection as from studying descrip­
tions. Empiiical findings are essential, but theories 
of scientific determinism cannot lead to an adequate 
understanding of society. «One of the most useful 
insights of religion is the recognition that all human 
action takes place in a world in which both determin­
ism and free will operate, and, indeed, are in per­
petual tension with one another.»2
The retreat from explicit political philosophy un­
doubtedly has caused a major revision in the field 
of political science, but the retreat has not elimi­
nated political philosophy. It has merely made it more 
difficult to recognize. It has produced a situation in 
which many investigators permit their methodologies 
to choose their philosophies rather than selecting 
their philosophies on a rational basis and then 
choosing their methods accordingly. Since political 
philosophy is inevitable how does it happen that 
many have been deluded into thinking that it can be 
avoided? Is this merely a matter of fashion or fad (the 
intellectual version of the «conventional wisdom»)? 
Such is the strength of intellectual fashion that it 
is frequently easier to judge propositions by their 
compatibility with the trends rather than by their 
merits. Thus fashion may make it relatively easy 
to accept «systems theories, communication theo­
ries, and structural-functional theories that are 
unpolitical theories shaped by the desire to explain 
certain forms of non-political phenomena. They of­
fer no significant choice or critical analysis of the 
quality, direction or fate of public life.»3 Such theo­
ries rather than dealing with the «real» world instead 
take us from that world.4
But is this the only reason? How, for example, 
can fashion be so persuasive that some extreme 
exponents go so far as to argue that all theory 
should be scientific theory? Consider, for example, 
Heinz Eulau’s statement that «the discovery and 
susceptibility of problems to behavioral treatment 
depends... on the quality and quantity of trained per­
sonnel that may be available in the future.»5
May this attitude also reflect the traditional Amer­
1. A. D. Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State, London: 
Oxford, 1955, p. 38
2. Robert Gordis, Politics and Ethics, Santa Barbara, 
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961, p. 29.
3. Wolin, p. 1063.
4. Sibley, p. 66.
5. Heinz Eulau, «Segments of Political Science Most Suscep­
tible to Behavioristic Treatment» in Charlesworth, p. 45.
ican bias against the past and againsth teory? Amer­
icans have spent a large part of their existence at­
tempting to throw off the shackles of history, attempt­
ing to break off and deny their European antece­
dents. The behavioral revolution may well be an 
instance of the typical American purging of the past. 
The effort to diminish the significance of political 
philosophy has activated a bias against tradition in 
the name of elimination of bias. The objection here 
is not to theory, per se, but to a tradition of theory.6
There may be another pertinent factor also. Might 
this not be an effort to obtain stability and consen­
sus in a chaotic world? The «scientific» approach 
could be adopted in an effort to produce findings that 
cannot be disputed. If the history of science is any 
guide, of course, such an effort would be doomed 
to failure, although jargon, mathematics, and esoter­
ic techniques may offer to some scholars an opportu­
nity to hide their own insecurity. But, alas, in the real 
world security blankets in whatever form, cloth or 
sophisticated scientific techniques, psychologically 
satisfying thought they may be, provide little real secu­
rity. «Access to an electronic computer or knowledge 
of the calculus does not transform a mediocre mind 
into a superior intellect.»7
The new approach appears to be a negative kind of 
political theory that maintains that virtually nothing 
worthwhile can be known or said about values; it 
is both a symptom and a cause of ethical relativism. 
In their search for rationalism the positivists have 
implicitly adopted a position that easily may be e- 
quated with the rejection of rationalism.8
At a recent professional meeting, a speaker an­
nounced that speculation was intellectually bank­
rupt. An engineer, he said, can accomplish nothing by 
speculation. Only by such activities, for example, 
as measuring the tensile strength of a steel beam can 
he produce a good bridge, not by speculating about 
the nature of bridges. When a questioner asked how 
scientific techniques could demonstrate whether the 
bridge were needed at all, and how scientific tech­
niques could answer such other questions of import 
to the quality of life as those relating to aesthetics, the 
speaker declined to answer the former question but 
maintained that such a thing as aesthetics does not 
truly exist. The quality of modern life has deteriorated 
sufficiently as it is. What would be the import for the 
future if extreme positions such as this were to be 
universally accepted?
Greaves notes another, and as he says less respect­
able, reason for the acceptance of the new science
6. Wolin, p. 1070.
7. Andrew Hacker, «The Utility of Quantitative Method 
in Political Science» in Charlesworth, p. 149.
8. See, H. R. G. Greaves, «Political Theory Today» in 
McCoy and Playford, pp. 323-334.
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of politics. He calls it the «politics of political stud­
ies.» That is, there are financial advantages to the 
production of non-controversial scholarly works. 
They avoid the risk of clashing with foundations. 
He quotes the late Arnold Rose to the effect that it 
is probable that power holders increasingly restrict 
the activities of social scientists, as the implications 
of their studies become apparent, since the social 
scientists must depend upon grants and awards to 
continue their research.1
«How much sounder and safer it seemed,» remarks 
McIntyre, «to be able to welcome the end of ideology 
and return to a comfortable and comforting English 
empiricism—to drop the theory and remain close 
to the facts. Henceforward the fact-gathering disci­
pline of political science would replace the imaginative 
flights of political theory.»2 It would seem that this 
hints at one of the most severe indictments that can 
be leveled at an intellectual group. The modern world 
is characterized by huge concentrations of power, 
and power has laws of its own. There are conse­
quences that flow merely from the possession of power 
that cannot be avoided. The holder of power, if he 
acts, must bear the responsibility for the conse­
quences. If he fails to act, he must also bear responsi­
bility for the consequences. In our powerful, com­
plex, world, the possibility of consequences that are 
bad in the extreme is ever with us. We cannot avoid 
them by choosing not to act. The only way to avoid 
the moral consequences for acts is to deny them; to 
deny that consequences exist, or to deny that mor­
als exist. I submit that at the heart of the positivis­
tic approach lies an attempt by its adherents to 
abdicate the intellectual responsibility for the con­
sequences of their own acts.
consequences of the scientific approach
In his excellent book, Science: The Glorious En­
tertainment, Jacques Barzun analyses our modern 
scientific culture and its effects upon values and the 
human personality. «Consider, for example,» he 
writes, «the after effects of such a work as that pub­
lished a few years ago on Premaritai Dating Be­
havior. We begin with the apparatus of questions and 
definitions, which includes a table of 'stages’ in the 
behavior under study. Stage Ά’ is : 'No dates within 
specified period;’ Stage 'B’ : 'No physical contact 
or only holding hands;’ and so on with increasing 
embellishments up to sexual intercourse, which is 
stage 'F\ All this is as detached as an insect study, 
except now and then when a sad or touching re­
1. Ibid., pp. 235-236.
2. A. C. McIntyre, «Recent Political Thought,» Political
Ideas, David Thomson, ed., Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969,
pp. 180-190.
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mark by one of the youths ('My, what a difference a 
car does make’) reminds us we are dealing with hu­
man beings.» 3
Barzun points out that a great deal of energy today 
is being expended upon manipulation. How many of 
us search for a science to control man? «Any social 
scientist in the grip of factuality—-that is, who 
thinks that findings dictate choices—is potentially 
a manipulator.»4 When it comes to the individual, 
it is science itself that is inexact because it deals sta­
tistically with the mass. Its definitions, says Barzun, 
are always partial in both senses, which is to say that 
science works with great accuracy by hit and miss. 
When it announces that the half life of Radon 222 is 
3.8 days, this tells us that half of any amount will 
disintegrate in that time; which half cannot be fore­
told. No one cares. «But if a law court jailed or hang­
ed half of the accused brought before it in any three 
or four days, without caring which half, there would 
be commotion even among scientists. The courts 
dare not work, much less predict, by number as sci­
ence does work with and predict the emission of alpha 
particles. What one ought to say, therefore, is that 
the law is exact, but not precise; science is precise, 
but not exact.»5
The effects of the scientific approach to the study 
of politics are apparent on all sides, but what is not 
so apparent are the subtle by-products of our at­
titudes towards science and technology. Take the 
polygraph as a case in point. First of all, despite 
popular terminology, it is not a «lie detector,» but 
merely a device to record variations in pulse rate, 
breathing, blood pressure, etc. The user of the machine 
must frame the questions and then interpret from 
the physiological readings whether the subject has 
lied, and if so, at what point. To be sure, such «evi­
dence» is inadmissible in most courts, but the mere 
existence of the machine may well impede the course 
of justice. Both the public and the jury frequently 
presume that the refusal to submit to a polygraph 
test is an indication of guilt. «The 'infallibility’ of 
machinery, the false name 'lie detector’, overcome 
all but the most rational.»6 Few persons even ques­
tion the validity of the far-fetched and probably 
unverifiable theory that associates truthfulness with 
physiological states.
An unfortunate study that was undertaken a few 
years ago at a leading university typifies much of the 
ill effects of positivism upon the social sciences to­
day. The investigators sought to determine whether
3. Pp. 181-182.
4. Ibid., p. 187; see also the writings of Thomas Szasz, M.D., 
for a discussion of psychiatry not as an «objective science» 
but as a manipulative tool with an implicitly coercive function.
5. Ibid., pp. 197-198.
6. Ibid., p. 220.
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any «distinguishable difference» existed after twenty- 
five years between those who as freshmen students 
had received any vocational counselling (even «one, 
two, or... several hours») and those who had received 
none.1 A few brief excerpts from the study can speak 
for themselves.
«In a later section of 'Contribution to Society’ is a descrip­
tion of a rating made on all living and located subjects in this 
study. For the nonrespondents the rating was based on credit 
rating secured from a commercial credit agency.» (page 55)
«Perhaps the best argument for the use of income as a meas­
ure of success is that, in an informal way, most people con­
sider it just that. The use of the husband’s income as a meas­
ure of the wife’s achievement is another matter. This intro­
duces another source of error. Probably an overwhelming 
one... however, data for both sexes are presented in the follow­
ing discussion.» (page 90)
«Virtually everyone still alive in this sample was rated. For 
600 individuals, both the questionnaire and the interview 
notes were available to the raters; for another 16, the question­
naire; and for another 51, the interview notes. Forthe remain­
ing 49, a credit report from the Retail Credit Association was 
used. These last reports were secured on all individuals de­
clining to furnish information for this study. While this may 
have been a devious procedure, it was justified on the following 
grounds: Many of those refusing to cooperate in this study 
were obviously among the most unsuccessful individuals. It 
seemed unwise to eliminate this group from the study so the 
only available channel of information was used.» (pages 99- 
100)
Note the consistent use of the passive voice. The 
investigator says, «It was justified,» not «I justified 
it.» With the proper tools, that is the scientific 
approach and the passive voice, it would appear 
that any investigator may claim to be absolved 
of responsibility for the consequences of his own 
investigation.
Let us return to the field of political science for an 
example of the manner in which scientific terminol­
ogy may be very persuasive even when substance 
is lacking. In the American Political Science Review 
of December, 1964, there occurred an exchange of 
letters on the construction of questionnaires.2 
The first letter refers to Herbert McClosky’s article 
«Consensus and Ideology in American Politics,» 
in the June 1964 issue. Its writer, Howard H. Lentner, 
clearly demonstrated that many of the items Profes­
sor McClosky used did not necessarily measure the 
attitude that they purported to measure, others were 
ambiguous, and still others included statements 
both of ends and means.
For example, respondents were asked to agree or 
disagree with the statement «People who hate our 
way of life should still have a chance to talk and be
1. David P. Campbell, Twenty-five Year Follow Up of 
Education-Vocational Counselling, US Office of Education, 
Cooperative Research Project 1346, University of Minnesota, 
1961-1963.
2. Pp. 963-965.
heard.» McClosky refers to this as a general state­
ment. The statement «freedom does not give anyone 
the right to teach foreign ideas in our schools» he 
refers to as a specific statement. Lentner points 
out that «freedom» is just as abstract as «our way 
of life» and «a chance to talk and be heard» is as 
general, or as specific for the matter, as «the right 
to teach foreign ideas in our schools.» Regarding 
ambiguity, he notes the item «If Congressional com­
mittees stuck strictly to the rules and gave every wit­
ness his rights, they would never succeed in exposing 
the many dangerous subversives they have turned up.» 
Lentner remarks that one might disagree with the 
statement and thus be classified as one who agrees 
with the rules of the game because he believes the 
Congressional committees have not turned up many 
subversives, or he might disagree with the statement 
because of its implication that congressional commit­
tees have not stuck to the rules. «Whose rules?» 
he asks. The rules of fair play or the rules of the 
House Committee on UnAmerican Activities? «On 
the other hand,» he says, «a respondent could agree 
with the statement, thus being classified as disagreeing 
with the 'rules of the game’, but believe that the prize 
of exposing subversives was not worth the cost 
of violating the 'rules of the game’.» Lentner goes on 
in some detail.
The second letter Was McClosky’s response to 
Lentner. His response seems to prove Lentner’s 
case. He says that Lentner «must know that the va­
lidity of a measure is not a matter of individual opin­
ion... and cannot be resolved by individual inspec­
tion of its face content.» It may well be true that an 
item’s validity cannot be established merely by its 
face content, but surely there are some items that can 
be ruled out on this basis. McClosky proceeds to say 
that «as anyone with knowledge of test construction 
can verify, unanimity in the rating of items is vir­
tually impossible to achieve. No matter how clear 
and appropriate an item may seem to most judges, 
there are always dissenters who will rate it as irrele­
vant, ambiguous, or otherwise inadequate. Similarly... 
even if an item were to be rated as perfect by every 
judge, not all respondents who answered in a given 
direction do so for identical reasons. Some will re­
spond for idiosyncratic reasons that have nothing 
to do with the 'purpose’ assigned to the item by the 
investigator. Some will score the item 'correctly’... 
but for the 'wrong’ reasons.... Some will also score it 
'incorrectly’ for the wrong reasons. Every item in an 
attitude scale, in short, is in some degree inescapably 
'multi-phasic’.» These difficulties would seem in­
surmountable, even though McClosky contends 
that they can be overcome by using large numbers 
of items with a large sample of respondents. In other 
Words, abstraction added to abstraction produces
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the concrete, or error added to error produces the 
truth.
If the social scientist is truly consistent, the more 
serious he is as a social scientist, the more likely 
he is to develop a state of indifference to goals, 
a state that some contend approaches nihilism. Since 
social science cannot pronounce upon the basic 
question of whether social science itself is good, it 
must be compelled to concede that society would 
have equal right to encourage social science or to 
suppress it as a nihilistic, corrosive, disturbing and 
subversive force. But despite this, we find social scien­
tists «very anxious to 'sell’ social science.»1
Some of our present social difficulties may stem 
from actions of the social scientist who believes that 
he can loudly criticize the foundations of society, call­
ing them merely ideology, myth, or emotional pref­
erence without shaking those very foundations.2 
Thorson believes that the tragedy of twentieth cen­
tury political science is its inability to defend democ­
racy against totalitarianism. He contends that this 
tragedy has been brought about by the artificially 
restrictive canons of rationality implicit in the ac­
ceptance of the positivistic point of view; that is, 
not by any genuine necessity, but by a philosophical 
mistake. The behavioral mood, moreover, is far 
from an intellectual advance. «The advocacy of 
scientific method in politics heard in the 1960’s does 
not differ markedly from the pronouncements of 
Merriam and Lasswell in the 1920’s and 1930’s. The 
behavioral mood’s most important philosophical 
support, Logical Positivism, has been dead in the 
halls of philosophy for nearly thirty years.»3
The source of the desire to manipulate that which 
is implicit in much of the social sciences is not evil, 
quite the contrary. The desire to manipulate comes 
about from the desire to do good, to improve. If 
they are ethically neutral, however, the social sci- 
ences cannot support these ends and the social scien­
tist, because he presumes that his discipline is ethically 
neutral, may well forget that manipulation means 
power, and power in itself may be a force for evil. 
We ignore Lord Acton’s dictum at our peril. In strange 
ways the social scientists have also been caught 
up in a situation that forces them to become advo­
cates of the status quo. This despite their presumed 
ability to be value free or nearly so. As Kariel puts 
it, «an appreciable number [of social scientists] have 
in fact helped give theoretical stability and respecta­
bility to a technologically harnessed pluralism.»4 
But an emphasis upon pluralism, upon the status 
quo, upon a reverent citinzenry, is undesirable,
1. Sabine, p. 51.
2. Thorson, Logic, p. 91.
3. Thorson, Biopolitics, p. 87.
4. Kariel, p. 139.
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regardless of its importance as a stabilizing force, 
if we regard democracy as in part a development 
of the self.5
Basically, it should be expected that much Ameri­
can scientific social research should condone a 
closed order because the effort, the approach, is 
scientific rather than political, and science and tech­
nology are apolitical, if not antipolitical, forces. 
The moment methodology becomes an end in itself, 
the guiding theory becomes unchangeable and the 
political process is in difficulty.
The non-partisan city manager form of govern­
ment is a case in point. Reformers have long advo­
cated this type of government for reasons of its ef­
ficiency and its explicitly non-political character. Here 
we have an effort to remove «Politics» from the po­
litical process. From some points of view it undeni­
ably works very well in smaller cities, it also places the 
people one step further removed from the control 
of the forces that administer their government. The 
lack of political responsibility and of political leader­
ship combine to make it very difficult to replace in­
cumbents on the city council, thereby producing 
great impediments to change and innovation.
Students of politics should recognize that however 
worthy the goals, a search for efficiency at the ex­
pense of politics is likely to produce ethical difficul­
ties. In this regard political science has lagged behind 
some other disciplines such as anthropology.
Between the two world wars, anthropology had dis­
carded its older monistic theory of linear evolution 
and had substituted pluralism. Each culture stood 
alone as a legitimate expression of human potential 
and was to be judged only by its own standards. 
Moral codes belong to a culture and are the result 
of its experience. Cultural relativity meant ethical 
relativity which worked admirably to cleanse the 
discipline of its older ethnocentrism. But the notions 
of universal values and fundamental law faded.
The rise of Nazism proved to be a great shock; 
if anthropologists were to remain thoroughly consis­
tent regarding cultural relativism, if they Were to 
remain thoroughly «scientific,» they would be forced 
to concede, before 1941, «that it was both irrelevant 
and impertinent for Americans to judge Nazi be­
havior by American standards. One of the founders 
of the functionalist school in anthropology, Bro­
nislaw Malinowski, recognized this fact, abandoned 
the position, and spent his last years developing a 
cultural theory that would disclose the evil in Nazi 
methods.»6
5. Lewis Lipsitz, «If, as Verba says, the State Functions as 
A Religion, What Are We to Do Then to Save Our Souls?» A- 
merican Political Science Review, LXII (2: June, 1968), p. 533.
6. Ralph Henry Gabriel, The Course of American Demo­
cratic Thought, New York: The Roland Press, 1956, pp. 
417-421.
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Other anthropologists joined in the endeavor. The 
scientific student of politics, however, only now is 
beginning to recognize that a discipline that fails 
to recognize values is sterile at best and is likely 
to be destructive. The fundamental objections to the 
Nazi theories of race are that they repudiate the 
claims of the brotherhood of man which are the 
basis of universalist ethics, leaving only an enlarged 
tribalism.1
Political scientists often argue that methods are 
neutral and that they do not presuppose a point 
of view. The anthropologists have discovered differ­
ently. As Wolin points out, the elevation of «method» 
to a position of prime importance has had curricular 
consequences. More and more of the time of the stu­
dent of politics is spent learning methodology rather 
than substance. But even more important is that 
the primacy of method affects the student’s view of 
the world. Especially the political world.
«The alleged neutrality of a methodist’s training over­
looks significant philosophical assumptions admittedly in­
corporated into the outlook of those who advocate scientific 
inquiry into politics. These assumptions are such as to rein­
force an uncritical view of existing political structures and 
all that they imply. For the employment of method assumes, 
even requires, that the world be one kind rather than another 
if techniques are to be effective.»2
When the world he is studying exhibits irregulari­
ties, rather than the assumed regularities, the stu­
dent who emphasizes method is in trouble, as indi­
cated by the sad state of theories of development 
or modernization.3
It is perhaps significant that many political scien­
tists, e.g. Eulau, now describe themselves as «normal 
scientists.» The term is Kuhn’s and means «...a 
type of scientist whose vocation is not to create 
theories or even to criticize them, but to accept the 
dominant theory approved by the scientific community 
and to put it to work.»4
At a time when the world appears to be progressing 
deeper and deeper into serious trouble, the disci­
pline of political science, along with the other social 
sciences, has become largely a spokesman for the 
status quo. It is therefore open to the charges of 
irrelevance. It has said little about destruction of 
the environment, about restless youth, about cities 
that become more difficult to inhabit each day, about 
destructive wars, or about the possibility of havoc 
on a worldwide scale. The commitment to science
1. See George E. G. Catlin, «Equality and What We Mean 
by It,» Equality (NOMOS IX), J. Roland Pennock and John 
W. Chapman, eds., New York: Atherton Press, 1967, p. 109.
2. Wolin, p. 1064.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
has served us ill. It has engendered a fear of the peo­
ple, indicated by its support for pluralist or broker­
age democracy, and its contention that apathy is a 
prerequisite to good government. It has transform­
ed the social sciences into conservative disciplines, 
despite the personal tendencies of most social sci­
entists toward liberalism. It had led to the more 
or less totally irrelevant, into a frenzied avoidance 
of the most pressing issues of the day. David E. 
Apter has, in fact, confirmed that American social 
scientists have been co-opted into the broader Amer­
ican establishment.5 It is true that there is now 
a. great deal of social criticism. By and large, however, 
it is concentrated not in the social sciences but else­
where, such as in literature, art, drama, film and 
music.
There seems to be an unfortunate tendency among 
many social scientists to select subjects for study not 
on the basis of their substance but rather their sus­
ceptibility to certain methodological treatment. Some 
government agencies, for example, have withheld 
approval of research grants until the proposed proj­
ect was sufficiently altered to produce ease in com­
puter processing of the information accumulated. 
This at times has resulted in major changes in sub­
ject matter emphasis. Such an approach will tend 
to produce studies that do not challenge the status 
quo, and that are irrelevant to the pressing problems 
of today. We have noted earlier that the scientific 
method, per se, is essentially antipolitical. Key has 
written that «a considerable proportion of the lit­
erature commonly classified under the heading of 
political behavior has no real bearing on politics, 
or at least its relevance has not been made ap­
parent.»6
In reading much of the literature of contemporary 
political science, one cannot help but be struck by 
its apparent unawareness of some of the most pro­
foundly significant changes in American culture. 
Does it not appear that the discipline is calling for 
«benign neglect,» when we hear leading political 
scientists announce that «apathy, non-voting and 
poor education are a good thing, i.e., system sustain­
ing, and that we should be most cautious about 
consciously inducing social change because of the 
danger of unstabilizing the political system?»7 It 
would appear that we could be less fearful of change
5. Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, Apolitical Poli­
tics : A Critique of Behavioralism, New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell, 1967, p. 2.
6. V.O. Key, Jr., «The Politically Relevant in Surveys,» 
Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV (March, 1960), p. 54, quoted 
in Ibid., p. 7.
7. Maure L. Goldschmidt, «Democratic Theory and Contem­
porary Political Science,» Ibid., p. 220.
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and more concerned with the direction in which we 
are heading.
Orwell wrote in 1948; we are now considerably more 
than halfway to 1984. Today we have the technology 
to destroy privacy; for example, the commercial 
credit organizations are already serving as an in­
terim step toward a private version of a national 
data bank.1 Senator Sam Ervin has undertaken 
a government-wide investigation to determine the 
extent to which federal data banks and the federal 
hunger for data are inconsistent with the consti­
tutional rights of the American citizens. He and 
others have commented upon a data bank operated 
by the Army at the Investigative Records Repository 
at Fort Holabird, Maryland. For this bank the army 
collected files on private citizens who participate in 
certain civil activities and civilian politics. Subse­
quent investigations of the domestic intelligence activ­
ities of the military have been equally startling. 
As Senator Ervin de.lares, «clearly, the army has no 
business operating data banks for surveillance of 
private citizens; nor do they have any business in 
domestic politics.»2
The zeal for experimentation also can contribute 
to the increasing erosion of privacy. A few years 
ago the FAA conducted a series of experiments on 
the people of Oklahoma City to determine how many 
daily unannounced sonic booms they could tolerate 
without becoming totally irate. There have been many 
articles in the last few years that comment upon the 
need for much tighter supervision and control over 
medical experiments upon unknowing patients. Per­
sons too often are denied dignity of treatment because 
they are considered by categories—welfare recip­
ients, policemen, political radicals, students, travel­
lers, racial, ethnic or religious minorities, business­
men—in short, as objects rather than as persons. 
This is understandable in an overpopulated World 
organized to promote industrial technology, but it 
fosters a tendency toward regimentation and toward 
a destruction of the privacy that remains.
Only by measuring our actions against an explicit 
political philosophy can we judge intelligently the
1. There is a vast amount of material available, particularly 
that resulting from the investigations of Representative Cor­
nelius Gallagher, see e. g., «Credit Investigations and Privacy,» 
Congressional Record, 91st Congress Second Session, April 1, 
1969, pages e2555-e2563; see also Campbell’s study of members 
of a college class after twenty-five years : «After all sources were 
exhausted, 21 names were left. At this point, a commercial 
locating agency, The Retail Credit Association, was contacted 
and asked to help. Their efficiency was chilling. Within two 
weeks (after we had spent six months), they supplied the cur­
rent address of 16 of the 21 people, at an average cost of $18 
per person.» (page 48)
2. Senator Sam Ervin, «Computers, Data Banks, and Con­
stitutional Rights,» Congressional Record, 91st Congress
Second Session, February, 3, 1970, S1084-S1091.
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desirability of our present direction. Only by in­
suring that our political actions are consistent with 
our political philosophy can we have some control 
over the course we will persue.
conclusion
We cannot determine scientifically which goals 
are proper, or which values are to be preferred. 
A value free political science is as undesirable as 
it is impossible. Since the study of politics presup­
poses a framework of values, hence, a political phi­
losophy, we should consciously and rationally select 
the political consequences of our own actions.
Such scholars as Reinhold Niebuhr contend that 
politics cannot function without power and that it 
must therefore be inherently immoral or at least 
amoral. It must be purely a tool for achieving pur­
poses that in themselves may be good, bad or indif­
ferent, and yet, the best of purposes are tainted by 
aggression, self-seeking and violence. Despite these 
stated views, Niebuhr has evidenced a lifelong con­
cern with social justice. His entire public activity, 
his liberalism is based upon the contention that in 
some manner ethics must be permitted to determine 
the character of politics. Many other who theoretically 
maintain that politics at best must be amoral, proceed 
to belie this orientation by their own public activi­
ties.3
There are few thinkers who do not implicitly rec­
ognize the truth that they may explicitly reject, 
that we must have a political philosophy that can 
direct us toward humane ends. This does not mean 
a narrow «moralism» which is sanctimonious and 
self defeating. Morality must be distinguished from 
moralism which has been described as «morality 
minus intelligence or honesty or both.»4
The demands of youth for «relevance» are justi­
fied; this pertains also to the social sciences. Society 
is faced with problems in urgent need of solution. 
Empirical studies are essential to show us what is, 
but they must be studies aimed at significant subjects, 
if they are to be worthwhile. We must also make our 
philosophy explicit, broaden our horizons, and direct 
our acts toward ethical consequences.
We must become aware of new factors that demand 
scientific investigation, but we must guide our actions 
by normative theory. This means that we must re­
frain from accepting the values of the status quo 
uncritically in the name of scientific objectivity. So­
cial scientists «must avoid rigid presumptions which 
diminish their vision, destroy their capacity for cri­
ticism and blind them to some of the most signifi-
3. Gordis, p. 4.
4. Ibid., p. 29.
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cant social and political developments of our time».1
The political scientist must recognize that philos­
ophy is implicit in his work, and must develop a 
political philosophy that can provide practical gui­
dance as well as theoretical insight. The discipline 
for too long has turned from its task of preserving 
and advancing worthy values. The political scientist 
must accept an activist role if he is to avoid eroding 
the principles and institutions to which he is personal­
ly committed. As Riemer reminds us, our primary 
concern is not for a puristic science for its own sake, 
but for the better life.2
As we pursue this goal we must remember Thor- 
son’s key principle, «do not block the possibility 
of change with respect to social goals.»3
If we are to avoid the burden of innocence, however, 
we must recognize that politics is the art of the pos­
sible. We must select our goals with care and not 
hope to achieve perfection. We must preserve our ca­
pacity for peaceful change and for the development 
of individual potential. We must select means that 
are consistent with our goals. We must reject rigid 
ideology, but articulate a core of values that can tran­
scend personal and national interests; we must sub­
ject ourselves, our discipline, and our society to 
critical evaluation.
If political science is to contribute to these ends, 
it must again consider the recently ignored question, 
«What constitutes the good life?» It must acknowl­
1. Jack L. Walker, «A Critique of the Elitist Theory of 
Democracy» in McCoy and Playford, pp. 218-219.
2. Riemer, p. 168.
3. Thorson, Logic, p. 139.
edge the wisdom of the ancients, recognize the 
changes in modern society, and enrichen its findings 
with new insights provided by social psychology and 
other disciplines, as well as by interdisciplinary 
studies.
We must recognize the validity of democratic 
theory, the workability of the conception of the 
public good, the urgency of the need to improve 
the quality, and manner of life, and we must use 
both scientific knowledge and its counterpart, «tac­
it» knowledge. We must combine technical exper­
tise with emphathy and understanding. We must avoid 
the unpardonable sin that is expressed through­
out the writings of Nathaniel Hawthorne: a cold 
hard intellectualism unleavened by human feeling. 
Even men of good will frequently find it difficult 
to agree; nonetheless, we must articulate a common 
core of values that will permit certain principles and 
practices and exclude others. Must the political 
scientist study politics as though politics were the 
actions of non-rational or irrational creatures? 
Must an observer strip himself of all personal feelings 
when he studies? There is a possibility that lies be­
tween «ruthless partisanship» and «aseptic neutral­
ity» that is a «strenuous but volatile combination of 
detachment and involvement.» We must distinguish 
between moral commitment and reckless parti­
sanship.4
If political science is to survive, or if it is to mat­
ter whether any academic study survives; if we our­
selves are to survive, we must recognize some abso­
lutes—absolutes are very few, but very necessary·
4. Kateb, pp. 82-83.
The political party is the primary means of modernization by virtue of its origin in the initiative 
of the modernist elites, its organization, which gives it a closer contact with the community than that 
possessed by the administration, and lastly its functions and aims, since it wishes to be, and in vari­
ous fields is, the motive force behind economic development.
Georges Balandier, Political Anthropology.
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